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ABSTRACT 
 
AlMarri, Asma A., Masters : January: 2019, Gulf Studies 
Title: The Contribution of the State of Qatar to the Syrian Displaced Population: A Case 
Study of the Syrian Forced Migrants in Qatar 
Supervisor of Thesis: Luciano Zaccara. 
Since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011, roughly 5.6 million Syrians 
have fled the country as a result of the ongoing conflict in the region. Many of them have 
crossed into Gulf nations such as Qatar, even though this nation was not a signatory to 
the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. This study aims to explore the efforts 
made by the Qatari government to improve the situation of Syrian forced migrants in 
Qatar as well as refugees elsewhere.  Interviews were carried out with Syrians who 
entered Qatar since 2011, recording narratives of their experiences in the country. The 
findings revealed that visa status had a strong influence on whether the experiences of 
Syrian forced migrants were positive or negative, and suggest that the Qatari government 
should do more to ensure that the human rights of the Syrian forced migrants within its 
borders are upheld. 
Key Terms: displacement; forced migrants; refugees 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces various concepts that are instrumental for establishing a research 
framework. The chapter is divided into several sections, which are necessary to define the 
context as well as the scope of the research. These sections include background 
information behind to the Syrian migrant crisis as implied by the main topic of research, 
and the resulting problem statement. Other sections in the chapter include the main 
research questions that arise as a result of the presented problem statement, and the 
formulated hypothesis. The last two sections address the theoretical framework, which is 
essentially the main conceptual framework the study will use to address the questions, 
and, finally, the significance of this study.  
1.1. Background of the Syrian Crisis  
The conflict in Syria, which started in 2011 and pitted Bashar al-Assad’s 
government against various forces, resulted in the displacement of millions of people 
within the country and into other countries within the region (Franklin, Cleveland and 
Guidi, 2015). At the end of 2014, reports estimated that a total of 7.6 million people in 
Syria were internally displaced and about 3.7 million others had fled the country 
(Ostrand, 2015). The conflict has not only resulted in the displacement of people, but it 
has also brought about the death of thousands of people and the destruction of essential 
infrastructure while contributing to a decline in the general living standards of the Syrian 
people.  
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An estimated 13.1 million Syrians are currently in need of humanitarian 
assistance (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2018). Schools, hospitals, 
healthcare centers, water and sanitation systems have all been destroyed as a result of the 
conflict. Marketplaces that were once busy, as well as historic sites, are now nothing 
more than rubble (Franklin et al., 2015). As a result of the conflict, the business and 
social ties that brought the Syrian people and those from neighboring countries together 
have been broken. Today, the Syrian crisis is described as the largest displacement and 
refugee crisis in modern times. The situation is indeed dire and has placed enormous 
strain on neighboring countries, including Qatar.   
 The Syrian refugee crisis has been described as the worst refugee crisis since 
World War II. In 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said that 
“Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time” (Grandi, 2016). He 
added that the crisis has been a major cause of suffering for millions of people, and urged 
nations around the world to take responsibility and address this crisis. According to 
Amnesty International (2014), 95% of all refugees from Syria fled primarily to five 
neighboring countries (Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon) in 2014. In Turkey, the 
population of Syrian refugees as of April 2018 stood at a staggering 3,577,752 
(Data2.unhcr.org, 2018). Other nations that hosted a majority of the Syrian refugee 
population included Lebanon at 976,002, Jordan at 671,919, Iraq at 250,184, Egypt at 
131, 019 and other Northern African nations at 33,545 (Data2.unhcr.org, 2018). Since the 
conflict erupted in Syria in 2011, more than 200,000 people have been killed and scores 
of others inside the country are in urgent need of humanitarian aid. More than ten million 
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Syrian citizens have been displaced internally or forced to seek asylum outside Syrian 
borders as refugees (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2018). A chart 
showing the dispersion of Syrian migrants to various countries in 2018 is shown in Figure 
1 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of the total Syrian refugees by country of asylum. 
  
Turkey 63.4
%
Lebanon 17
.3%
Jordan 1
1.9%
Iraq 4.
4%
Egypt 2.3%
Other (North 
Africa) 0.6%
Dispersion of Syrian Refugees in 
Various Countries
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1.2. Problem Statement 
 Syrians find themselves subjected to new abuses as a result of their displacement, 
and often experience negative attitudes within their country or in refugee camps in 
surrounding countries. Current studies indicate that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states have not done enough to enhance the situation of Syrian refugees, in large part 
because they did not sign the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention (referred to as the 
1951 Convention hereafter) (BBC 2016).  
 For the purpose of this study, various definitions are used to label the subjects of 
the research based on their legal status and recognition by either international 
organizations or the State of Qatar. Thus, “displaced persons” or “displacement” will 
refer to the forced movement of people from their locality, which could be internally 
(within their countries) or externally (outside their countries borders). This occurs mostly 
because of wars or natural disasters.  On the other hand, “refugee” refers to a person who 
is forced to leave his home country because of war or persecution or natural disasters, 
living either in refugee camps or as an asylum seeker according to the 1951 Convention. 
Finally, “forced migrant” refers to a person who is forced to leave his or her home 
country because of war, persecution or natural disasters, but is located in countries in 
which official refugee status is not recognized. For this study the term ‘forced migrants’ 
is used to describe the Syrian displaced persons who fled their country as a consequence 
of the crisis and entered GCC countries, which are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.  
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Following these definitions, this study aims to explore the experiences of “forced 
migrants” in Qatar, as well as to assess the assistance provided by Qatar to the “refugees” 
located in camps in countries where this status is recognized. 
This dissertation provides a study into the efforts made by the State of Qatar to 
assist the plight of Syrian refugees in the region, and the experiences of the Syrian forced 
migrants who entered Qatar after the crisis. The plight of refugees is an evolving 
phenomenon. This is because the challenges facing refugees do not end when they leave 
their country, but continue when they arrive in another country and are faced with the 
challenge of starting a new life in an entirely different environment.  
This paper focuses on the issues displaced Syrians face as they embark on 
rebuilding their lives, with a special focus on Syrian forced migrants who have entered 
Qatar. The paper answers the question of how Syrians enter Qatar, their options for 
employment and their options regarding accommodation. This is contrary to the common 
view that countries in the GCC have failed to shoulder the responsibility of opening their 
borders to their Muslim brothers and sisters fleeing violence and death in Syria, for which 
these nations have been strongly criticized. However, some studies have revealed that 
GCC states have done a little to address the Syrian refugee situation. This research seeks 
to determine the extent to which these revelations are true. The research uses a range of 
methods in the examination of issues surrounding the plight of Syrian migrants who have 
arrived in Qatar since the crisis.  
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1.3. Main Research Question 
This study aims to answer the following primary research question:  
 What efforts have been made by the State of Qatar to improve the situation of 
“displaced” Syrians after the crisis? 
This question could be answered by addressing three secondary questions:  
 What efforts have been made by the Qatari government to assist Syrian “refugees” 
who are displaced elsewhere? 
 What are the experiences of Syrian migrants in relation to the Qatari’s government 
actions?  
 What efforts have been made by the Qatari government to address issues regarding 
Syrian “forced migrants” inside Qatar? 
1.4. Research Hypothesis 
 Following the research questions mentioned above, this study aims to test the 
following hypothesis. First, that regardless of not being a signatory member of the 1951 
Convention on refugees, the State of Qatar continues to enhance the experiences of both 
Syrian forced migrants inside Qatar and Syrian refugees in the region through a diversity 
of humanitarian aid tools and initiatives. 
 In order to demonstrate that hypothesis, the experiences of the Syrian forced 
migrants in Qatar, as well as the funding provided to humanitarian aid by the Qatari 
government will serve as variables for this study. 
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1.5. Theoretical Framework 
This study is based on the concept of cosmopolitanism.  Cosmopolitanism is 
grounded in the idea of moral universalism and argues for the equal moral status of all 
people. In its support of humanitarian intervention, liberal cosmopolitanism makes three 
key assumptions. The first one is that all people have equal rights and freedoms, which 
key institutions are meant to protect. The second assumption is that all people have these 
rights and freedoms irrespective of their cultural, religious and national backgrounds. The 
final assumption is that it is the concern of all people, states and organizations to protect 
these rights and freedoms (Janse, 2006). As such, the liberal cosmopolitan view has its 
basis in a theoretical foundation that supports the authority of morality as well as 
universal human rights. Teson (2003) argues that in situations where some people are 
denied basic human rights, and are therefore unable to pursue their independent projects, 
it is the primary duty of others to step in and help. From the liberal cosmopolitanism 
perspective, violating universal human rights is not moral, and theoretical support for 
humanitarian intervention is thus provided by the authority of morality. By analyzing the 
plight of Syrian refugees, particularly those who seek asylum in the Middle East, this 
study hopes to relate the concept of cosmopolitanism to the Syrian crisis. The crisis is an 
ideal study, since it helps us to determine whether or not liberal cosmopolitanism is 
actively realized through an examination of the treatment of Syrian refugees and asylum 
seekers within the State of Qatar.  
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1.6. Significance of the Study and Objectives 
Within the Gulf region, there is limited literature on the Syrian situation and GCC 
countries’ management of displaced Syrians, whether they are refugees or forced 
migrants, even though the majority of refugees in the world today have come from this 
region. The Syrian crisis has led to the country becoming an alleged battlefield for a 
proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the GCC, the proportion of foreign migrants 
is greater than that of the resident populations, with the exception of two nations, Saudi 
Arabia and Oman. Most of the GCC nations lack comprehensive information regarding 
aliens, and it is not easy to find data from alternative sources. Furthermore, countries that 
produce refugees do not keep records of citizens leaving, and it is an onerous task to find 
information regarding those returning or migrating. In some cases, these citizens avoid 
signaling when they depart and might not want to be recorded, preferring to be 
overlooked. Thus agencies rely on information from the host country to evaluate the 
characteristics and number of refugees and asylum seekers.  
In 2012, the six Gulf States unanimously expelled the Syrian ambassadors. In 
Qatar, the situation was worse because it supported a group that opposed the Syrian 
government. Named the Syrian National Coalition, this anti-Assad group received Syrian 
representation from the Qatari government. The group received a mandate to deal with 
administrative needs concerning Qatar-based Syrians. Afterward, it was supposed to 
extend its mandate to expatriates from Syria to other nations in the Gulf region by June 
2015.  
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The fact that the Gulf states did not sign the 1951 Convention and its 1967 
Protocol implies that humanitarian efforts by major refugee organizations are limited 
within GCC borders. Although one may read information regarding the plight of refugees 
and asylum seekers in the GCC, the credibility of the sources from within this region may 
be subjected to scrutiny because of possible bias. Figures corresponding to the stock of 
refugees have no support from official documentation, and those who publish the 
information give no sources to verify the authenticity of such reports. Qatar's actions 
depict its opposition to the plight of the al-Assad regime. Qatar has reportedly armed 
rebels in Syria and donated millions of dollars to assist refugees. However, the nation 
does not have official documentation about the programs aimed at assisting refugees. The 
plight of Syrian refugees in the country should also be questioned, since the Ministry of 
Education (known as the Supreme Education Council) does not admit students without 
residency permits into its schools. As such, Syrian refugees and asylum seekers may not 
be eligible for certain programs if they hold temporary visas.  
This study aims to fill a gap in the literature by providing insight into the situation 
of displaced Syrians in Qatar, and thus may provide useful information for humanitarian 
organizations and others wishing to understand the plight of Syrian migrants. It will also 
suggest how the Qatari government could do more to improve the situation of the Syrian 
migrants within Qatar. 
 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows:   
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 Chapter 2 reviews the literature available on refugees in the Gulf region, 
as well as the relevant international law.   
 Chapter 3 describes the research approach, the methodology and the data 
collection process.  
 Chapter 4 presents the collected data and analysis.  
 Chapter 5 presents and discusses the results and findings of the research. 
 Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter comprises various literature sources used to address the hypothesis of this 
study. The sources presented are primarily articles, journals and previous research 
conducted by various authors on the migrant crisis in Syria and refugees in the Gulf 
region.  The chapter is divided into sections based on the areas of research that the 
literature sources are addressing. The first section entails the response of Western nations 
to the Syrian crisis, primarily based on humanitarian aid and support. The second section, 
on the other hand, focuses on how the Gulf nations have responded to the crisis; this 
functions as a comparison to the Western approach. This chapter also seeks to expound 
on the 1951 Convention and the member states that are signatories. This includes 
pointing out some of the issues with the convention, which have often been cited by non-
signatory members. The chapter then presents Lebanon as a case study on how Gulf 
nations have often handled refugees. To place the study into context, literature sources 
related to international humanitarian laws and trends in refugee populations in recent 
years are also presented in different sections. The chapter also examines trends in refugee 
populations around the world and how the Gulf States have responded. Finally, the 
chapter presents the case of Qatar and how it has handled refugees and migrant crises in 
recent years, both internally and externally.  
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2.1. Western Nations and the Syrian Crisis 
Critics have frequently questioned the contribution of GCC countries to resolving 
the Syrian refugees’ predicament. According to Martinez (2015), many European and 
Western nations have accepted refugees as per the 1951 Convention, which invites 
criticism of the Gulf countries (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1951). 
GCC countries have defended themselves by claiming that they have taken in refugees as 
asylum seekers (Schatz, 2016). However, according to the official figures posted on the 
UNHCR website, Western nations continue to bear the brunt of asylum seekers, 
especially from Syria and thus the credibility of this claim by the GCC is doubtful. 
(Tyyskä, Blower, DeBoer, Kawai, & Walcott, 2017). However, according to the GCC, 
critics have not considered asylum seekers as refugees, resulting in the assumption that 
they have not significantly contributed to the resolution of the refugee crisis. The 
UNHCR (2017b) defines a refugee as an individual fleeing persecution or conflict, and 
international law identifies and protects him or her from expulsion or returning to 
situations that threaten his or her freedom and life. On the other hand, an asylum seeker is 
an individual that requests sanctuary in a given nation but is yet to be processed 
(UNHCR, 2017a).  Another aspect that can be used as a basis for determining how 
nations are engaged in the Syrian crisis is the amount of money or foreign aid donated to 
Syria and its citizens. The figures in this regard indicate that the European Union and the 
United States are at the top of the list of donors (Syrianrefugees.eu, n.d.). Although this 
may suggest that Western nations are more proactive, GCC countries such as Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with much lower gross domestic 
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products also feature predominantly on the list. The graph below shows the amount of 
donations in US dollars given to Syria by various nations.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Graph showing humanitarian aid given to Syria in million $US by the top 10 
international donors (source: Syrianrefugees.eu) 
 
 
Additionally, there are some GCC countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which claim to 
have directly received thousands of refugees and to have provided them with benefits 
such as free healthcare and education (Khazaal, 2015). GCC member countries are non-
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signatories to the 1951 Convention and, therefore, are not obliged by law to resettle 
refugees, which might explain the reason for the ambiguity in their actions. 
2.2. The GCC and the Syrian Crisis 
Gulf refugee policies are complex, thus making it difficult to understand their 
reasons for not accepting refugees. According to Malsin (2015), the Violations 
Documentation Centre, which is a human rights group for Syrians, claim that it is 
imperative to tighten border restrictions within the GCC to aid refugees to migrate to the 
European Union. Non-signatory countries do not give any clear reasons for denying 
refugees entry. Many arguments have been voiced in an attempt to explain such a stand. 
In Qatar, it is argued that foreigners already outnumber Qatari citizens, ruling out the 
possibility that refugees are denied entry into the country because they might create a 
foreigner–citizen imbalance. Bershidsky (2015) adds that the deceptiveness experienced 
in close cultural exchanges between Syrians seeking asylum and nationals of GCC 
nations limits the propensity of these countries to accept foreigners from the war-torn 
country. Some non-signatory countries claim that taking in refugees may influence their 
social and cultural beliefs, as well as lifestyles and religion. Moreover, these non-
signatories view the taking in of refugees as provocation to the refugees' enemies, which 
might bring war to their countries. Therefore, to maintain peace and harmony, they would 
rather give financial aid to refugees outside their borders.  
The six Gulf countries, Qatar included, have not provided any resettlement places 
for Syrian refugees.  By October of 2018, there were about 397,353 registered Syrian 
refugees living in camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt (Data2.unhcr.org, 
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2018). This is in comparison with Western countries, especially in Europe, which, up to 
the present, have hosted the majority of the 5,640,421 total registered Syrian refugees 
(Data2.unhcr.org, 2018).   
The Gulf faces criticism for not accepting refugees while Western countries and 
European nations are opening their doors to refugees. In this regard, the question that 
critics do not ask themselves is whether the Gulf is to blame for rejecting refugees. 
According to Kayaoğlu (2015), the Gulf is not to blame for the Syrian crisis. He argues 
that a mix of social, economic and domestic political considerations have influenced the 
Gulf's actions. Kayaoğlu points out that Qatar is a small country and that therefore, unlike 
other nations, does not have the luxury of bringing in refugees. In addition to the socio-
economic, demographic and political factors affecting the acceptance of refugees into the 
Gulf countries, lurking security risks are also at the forefront of policymakers’ minds. In 
this regard, Kayaoglu (2015) states that the possibility of Islamic State and Al-Qaeda 
militants blending in with refugees and moving to the Gulf, Europe and North America is 
extremely high. Therefore, perceived security risks, socio-economic constraints and 
domestic political considerations may be the reasons behind the GCC’s reluctance to 
receive refugees. 
2.3. The 1951 United Nations Convention 
After 3000 Afghani boats arrived on the shores of Australia (albeit a small 
number compared with the million Afghans who were hosted by Iran and Pakistan), this 
sparked a debate over refugees in Australia in 2000, implying that countries began to 
look carefully at the 1951 United Nations Convention (Parliament of Australia, 2000). 
  
   
16 
 
This agreement related to the 1967 Protocol and the status of refugees throughout the 
world. The world has three sets of nations regarding economic power according to the 
World Economic Situations Prospect of the United Nations (2018). The first set entails 
rich countries, referred to as the developed economies, which have no issue with the 
implementation of the program; examples include the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development nations. The second set comprises developing economies that 
discourage refugees from seeking asylum. One of these is the war-torn republic of 
Somalia, which signed the 1951 Convention. The final set involves emerging economies 
in proximity to countries that send refugees; these are not signatories to the protocol. 
Examples include Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and India, whose chief reason for not 
signing is to avoid attracting refugees from neighbouring nations (United Nations, 2018).  
Figure 3 below shows the signatories and non-signatories of the 1951 Convention. 
The figure shows that some of the Gulf nations are non-members, including Qatar 
(Forced Migration Review, 2018).  
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Figure 4: Signatories and non-signatories of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
(Source: Forced Migration Review (2018)) 
 
 
From a historical viewpoint, creating the 1951 Convention enabled governments 
to deal with the mass numbers of refugees in war-torn Europe after World War II and 
later during the Cold War in the 1950s. The number of refugees has significantly 
increased since that time, with the UNHCR highlighting the 1.7 million refugees in 
Pakistan at the end of 2011. Consequently, signing the 1951 Convention has had resource 
implications for nations that welcome refugees. For instance, nations that admitted 
refugees into their borders are obliged to provide the humanitarian aid that comes with 
being the host nation. The nations also have to mobilize more resources to enhance 
security measures, such as vetting these refugees to ensure that terrorism threats and other 
security concerns are addressed.  
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Poorer nations are confronted by the costs of processing the claims of asylum 
seekers, and meeting their housing, health and education needs. In particular, 
governments of the nations in proximity to war-torn areas find these obligations to be 
significant practical resource issues. The foreign ministry in Malaysia, for instance, does 
not accept refugees because its geographical location would allow an influx of asylum 
seekers. It would mean that the country would potentially resettle hundreds of thousands 
of refugees in its camps. The Malaysian government considers the task of providing 
solutions, assistance and protection to refugees to be an obligation of the international 
community. Consequently, the nation may provide asylum seekers and refugees with aid; 
however, in this regard, the UNHCR provides the necessary services and resources.  
To have these services and resources available for its operations, the UNHCR also 
receives funds from donor nations. The donations received are crucial in the UNHCR’s 
annual expenditure, as well as that of the various humanitarian operations that the 
international organization oversees. For instance, the 2017 annual budget for the UNHCR 
totaled $3,249,999,178. The biggest donor for the Organization during this period was the 
United States, which donated $1,460,236,943. Other main suppliers of funds included the 
European Union, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The list also 
showed that some of the GCC Countries made donations. The state of Qatar was the 
biggest donor, which donated $26,804,578. Saudi Arabia came second among the GCC 
countries, donating $17,436,078, whereas the UAE, Kuwait and Oman donated 
$9,878,349, $8,199,289 and $301,213 respectively. This demonstrates that even though 
some countries are not signatories of the 1951 Convention, they still actively play a role 
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in the provision of humanitarian aid to refugees (United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees, 2018). As such, the 1951 Convention system does not reflect practical 
considerations or the reality of hosting refugees. Several nations that have not yet signed 
the 1951 Convention exist in areas where many of their neighbors are non-signatories. 
Thus they may only get support and access to a regional system if they deal with these 
nations.  
2.4. Issues with the 1951 Convention 
According to the 1951 Convention, a refugee is an individual who is persecuted 
for reasons of political or social group opinion, nationality, religion and/or race (United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1951). In this case, this person is outside his/her 
country of citizenship, and is unwilling or unable to return to this nation to get protection. 
One of the obligations is avoiding penalizing them for illegal entry; the other is not 
sending such persons back to their country of origin. Although this seems like an 
excellent way to deal with refugees, the 1951 Convention does not fit the current century. 
Firstly, the 1951 Convention fosters an unfortunate and simplistic characterization of 
refugees as poor and needy, juxtaposing this with abuse or political frameworks, which 
implies that the refugees are genuine and deserving. Secondly, asylum seekers do not 
receive the same public sympathy as refugees. For instance, in countries such as 
Australia, the majority of the public has often maintained that asylum seekers should be 
kept in detention camps. This is backed by a study conducted by the Lowy Institute, 
which ranks asylum seekers arriving by boat on Australian shores as the sixth greatest 
threat to Australia’s vital interests, listed by 38% of responses from interviewees (Oliver, 
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2017). Thirdly, nations in the West spend more funds on supporting and resettling asylum 
seekers than others, and their contributions to the UNHCR are significantly greater than 
those of other countries. Zamora et al. (2015) stated that the United States has admitted 
over 20,000 asylum seekers from 2001 to 2013 
In 2014, the European Union resettled 7525 persons and the figure of refugees 
from all source countries rose from 313,645 in 1998 to 627,780 in 2014 (Zamora et al., 
2015). In 2015, 3765 asylum seekers were Syrian compared with 122,065 in 2014. This is 
verified by official data from the UNHCR website, which notes that in 2014, Europe 
settled around 714,300 asylum seekers, a rise of 47% from the previous year. The 
UNHCR further noted that the top five countries with the most asylum seekers 
application were Germany, the United States, Turkey, Sweden and Italy. These nations 
received the majority of the applications at 60% of all applications United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees, 2014). In this list, the majority of these countries are Western 
nations. Fourthly, the inequity between the signatory countries to the 1951 Convention 
and camp refugees is significant, with priority being accorded in the context of mobility 
rather than necessity.  
Fifthly, the Convention does not consider the social, financial and political effects 
of an influx of asylum seekers into a particular country. Sixthly, the 1951 Convention 
also does not confer any aid to refugees until they arrive in a signatory nation. As such, 
the country that expels or persecutes citizens does not come under any obligation. Even 
more significantly, the 1951 Convention does not require the burden of meeting refugees’ 
needs to be shared between the signatory and refugee-sending country. Finally, the 1951 
  
   
21 
 
Convention's definition of refugees, as well as the notion of exile as a solution to issues 
they face, is outdated. 
2.5. Lessons from Lebanon: Migration Trends and 
Consequences 
Countries that choose to welcome refugees may find it a difficult task to deal with 
the influx. For instance, Lebanon is in close geographic proximity to Syria, which means 
it is one of the most prominent destinations for Syrian refugees. The country is only the 
size of Qatar and has a population of 4 million persons, but it has 1.2 million Syrian 
refugees (Dionigi, 2014). In this case, Lebanese institutions have had to take five critical 
steps to ensure the safety of refugees. Firstly, they needed to develop and establish 
regional cooperation to protect refugees. Second, the civil and academic community was 
obliged to support communication and develop research methods to depict the crisis in a 
realistic manner that aimed to resolve problems as well as avoid xenophobic rhetoric 
from spreading. Thirdly, these institutions had to allow Syrian refugees in the country to 
enjoy the fundamental rights of citizens as well as access to essential life services 
(Dionigi, 2014). As a fourth step, political groups were required to address the presence 
of Syrian refugees in the nation as a humanitarian crisis. As such, this enabled them to 
avoid further politicizing the identity of refugees in linking their presence to a broad set 
of existing sectarian or political factions. Finally, Lebanese institutions needed to develop 
a transparent legal system that provided refugees with a well-defined status to protect 
their human rights (Dionigi, 2014).  
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The Lebanese public was also tasked with three obligations. Firstly, it needed to 
be aware that nations and their governments have a global legal duty to aid in the 
protection and assistance of refugees. As such, the context of these considerations is 
international customary law, reinforced by several international treaties that many nations 
ratify regularly. Second, the public should use documented and reliable sources 
concerning refugees in their country (Dionigi, 2014). In this case, they should avoid 
adopting superficial unjustified perceptions and stereotypes caused by insecurity that 
relate to the process of immigration. Lastly, the public should donate to transparent and 
reputable aid organizations that publicly give an account of their activities. Although 
these recommendations appear plausible, one should note that Syrian refugees make up 
about one quarter of Lebanon’s entire population. Thus, the implications from an 
economic, social and political viewpoint are significant.  
2.6. International Humanitarian Law  
International humanitarian law is a set of rules that aim to reduce the impact of 
war. As such, this law is applied to guarantee the protection of individuals who no longer 
participate in armed conflict in their nation (Jaquemet, 2001). Accordingly, refugees and 
asylum seekers are people who have crossed international frontiers and are at risk of 
being persecuted by their country of origin. The human rights law, with its principle of 
non-refoulement (i.e. not forcing refugees and asylum seekers to return to a country 
where they may be in danger because of their race, religion, political opinion, etc.), 
protects refugees. Similarly, the refugee law accords them protection under the 1969 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1951 
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Convention (Jaquemet, 2001). International humanitarian law also protects refugees 
within a nation that participates in a war. As such, general protection is accorded in 
addition to the security civilians receive under this legislation, to complement the 
Additional Protocol I and the Fourth Geneva Convention. This legislation implies that the 
nations involved in armed conflicts should not distinguish refugees from nationals and 
should not attempt to treat them as aliens, especially when they do not receive protection 
from any other nation. Consequently, international humanitarian law prohibits collective 
punishment that entails destroying refugees’ houses or establishments (Jaquemet, 2001). 
Similarly, it forbids the starvation of refugees or the destruction of any object on which 
they depend to survive; it also states that it is illegal to attack refugees or their 
establishments directly. In situations of armed conflict, it is imperative to let refugees and 
asylum seekers gain access to humanitarian aid and relief agencies that support their 
well-being. The nations involved in the war should assist in the supply of relief tents, 
blankets, foodstuffs and medications.  
2.7. Trends in Refugee Populations around the World 
According to the Pew Research Center, the world had more than 60 million 
displaced persons in 2015 (Connor, 2016). The UNHCR quotes this figure as 65.6 million 
individuals, 22.5 million of whom are refugees and over half are under the age of 18 
(United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2017). Although about 190,000 
refugees were resettled in 2016, 10 million remain stateless. Fifty-five percent of the 
refugees and asylum seekers in the world originate from three nations, namely Syria, 
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Afghanistan and South Sudan. Figure 4 below is an illustration of the major source 
countries for refugees in 2016.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Major Source Countries of Refugees in 2016 (Source: United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (2016)). 
 
 
Refugees and asylum seekers are hosted in different parts of the world. Africa has 
taken 30%; the Middle East, and North Africa, 26%; Europe, 17%; the Americas, 16%; 
and Asia-Pacific, 11%. The top hosting nations for refugees and asylum seekers include 
Turkey (2.9 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Lebanon (1 million), Islamic Republic of 
Iran (979,400), Uganda (940,800) and Ethiopia (791,600) (Figure 5). The 10 million 
stateless individuals have no access to fundamental human rights like the freedom of 
movement, employment, medical care and education.  
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Figure 6: Major host countries of refugees (Source: UNHCR global trends) 
 
 
Approximately 50% of the refugees and asylum seekers seeking entry into the 
United States are Muslim (Connor, 2016). In Greece, about 100 refugees arrived on boats 
in the summer of 2016 from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, compared with the thousands 
who came earlier. In 2015, European Union countries, including Switzerland and 
Norway, received 1.3 million refugees and asylum seekers, 378,000 of whom were from 
Syria (Connor, 2016). This is illustrated in Figure 6 below.  In 2015, about 4 million 
Syrians were displaced from their homes. Currently, the total number of displaced 
Syrians stands at 12.5 million.  Of these, about 6 million are internally displaced persons, 
1 million seek asylum in Europe, and the rest are refugees in North Africa, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Turkey. This figure is unprecedented, since only 1 million Syrians were 
displaced in 2011. Figure 7 below illustrates the rise in Syrian refugees in the last couple 
of years.  
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Figure 7: European asylum seekers in 2015 (Source: Pew Research Center). 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Number of Syrian refugees between 2013 and 2018 (Source: United Nations 
High Commission of Refugees). 
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2.8. The Contribution of the Gulf States 
As the migrant crisis continues to escalate on the borders of Europe, Gulf states 
have been blamed for not offering any resettlement places to Syrian refugees escaping the 
war. In response, Kuwait claimed it had granted long-term residency permits to Syrian 
refugees and asylum seekers (De Bel-Air, 2015). 
Similarly, the government of the UAE said it had provided refuge to the 100,000 
Syrian refugees who entered the country and has about 2.5 times that number coexisting 
with its nationals (Uae-embassy.org, n.d.) (Figure 8).  
 
 
 
Figure 9: UAE support to Syria (Source: Uae-embassy.org) 
 
 
Additionally, the Foreign Ministry of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia responded 
that since the onset of the crisis in Syria in 2011, it had offered asylum to over 2.5 million 
Syrian nationals (De Bel-Air, 2015). Furthermore, its schools have registered over 
100,000 students from the crisis-torn nation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also 
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considers any expatriate as a guest with a temporary work contract or visitor visa, but the 
probability of reuniting them with their families is very small. Consequently, the claims 
of governments in the GCC raise several queries. Firstly, one may question the role these 
nations played in the enforcement of incentives to provide support to individuals from 
Syria who were fleeing from the crisis. Secondly, one may question the notion of 
allowing more Syrian refugees and asylum seekers to enter their borders by relaxing 
residency and entry restrictions beyond the average flow of dependents and employees. 
Finally, the available data on demographics should support their claims of assisting 
refugees and asylum seekers from Syria. 
2.9. Efforts Made by Qatar 
2.9.1. Internal Efforts: Syrian Migrants who Entered Qatar since the 
Crisis 
Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis at the end of 2010, many headlines in the 
international media from observers have criticized how member states of the GCC (which 
include Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia) have helped, or not helped, 
in the resettlement of Syrian refugees. Typical examples of such headlines include the 
following: “For desperate Syrian refugees, the Arab Gulf is not an option” (The Times, 
2015), “The Gulf States should do more for Syrian refugees” (Al-Khatteeb, 2015), “U.N. 
calls on Gulf countries to do more to help Syrian refugees” (Middle East Observer, 
2017). However, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Dr. Khalid Al Attiyah, was quoted by Doha 
News as saying that Qatar had in no way fallen short in extending a hand to help Syrian 
refugees (Kovessy, 2016). He stated that Qatar had opened its borders to over 25,000 
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refugees of Syrian origin since the country slid into civil war in 2011. However, to be 
accurate, Qatar does not recognize the “refugee” category, and instead refers to the 
displaced Syrians as “migrants” or sometimes “guests”.  
2.9.2. External Efforts: Aid for Syrian Refugees 
In the summer of 2015, Qatar instituted new initiatives to feed the refugees 
situated in Lebanon, provide treatment and medical supplies for wounded refugees 
located in Jordan, and provide clean drinking water for others inside Qatar. Qatar has 
been relentless in calling for the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad from power. It also 
was the first country to have a Syrian embassy that was run by the Syrian opposition in 
Doha. The UNHCR has confirmed that the GCC countries, led by Qatar, have been the 
biggest contributors in terms of dollars to United Nations programs that are geared 
toward helping Syrian refugees (Kovessy, 2016). However, many people feel that these 
countries could do much more, considering that the GCC countries have also helped to 
foster the escalation of the Syrian crisis by funding rebel groups that have been trying to 
overthrow al-Assad’s regime. Most of these countries, including Qatar, have publicly 
declared support for political factions as well as supplying weapons and engaging in 
ideological discourse around the Syrian crisis (Chulov, 2012). In addition, the GCC 
countries are the wealthiest in the region, and have better facilities and infrastructure that 
could easily allow them to settle refugees compared with countries such as Lebanon and 
Jordan, which still import much of their energy and have weaker infrastructure. Many of 
the GCC countries also have a significant demographic imbalance, with the majority of 
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their populations being made up of people from foreign countries; some having as much 
as 80% of their populations made up of foreigners.  
One of the reasons why GCC countries are unwilling to comply with international laws 
on refugees and opening borders to refugees is that most, if not all, of them are not 
signatories to the 1951 Convention and the UNHCR Protocol of 1967 that defined the 
status of refugees and how state parties should approach and handle refugee crises when 
they arise (Forced Migration Review, 2018). The GCC countries, along with 37 other 
countries, failed to ratify this convention, as they had not given proof of how they would 
comply with internationally agreed humanitarian standards as well as their ability to work 
with the UNHCR. There are a number of reasons why the countries that chose not to sign 
might have undertaken this decision at the time. In my opinion, perhaps the most 
fundamental reasons were political. For instance, a large part of the world’s nations at the 
time might have not been independent and, as such, decisions such as this one were 
reliant on the colonial powers that governed them. Another reason that may have been 
cited by the nations that chose not to sign was perhaps the lack of clear procedures and 
guidelines on how to admit and facilitate refugees in the host nations. Economic 
capabilities and the challenges that come with hosting refugees may have also played a 
role in the decision made by the 37 nations not to sign the convention. Finally, some of 
the countries may have been reluctant to sign because of the compromises they would 
have to reach in as far as their own national security was concerned, along with 
international context in light of the 1948 Israeli war. This has become increasingly 
  
   
31 
 
evident in recent years as more and more countries, especially in Europe, become 
reluctant to admit refugees, citing security reasons and terrorism concerns.  
Refugees face a host of challenges, both as they seek asylum and when they land 
in the host countries and start the process of rebuilding their lives. Refugees and their 
plight pose a development issue with socio-economic ramifications. Some of the refugees 
perish in seas and forests as they attempt to run from violence. Children and women 
suffer immensely as they bear the brunt of war (Barnard, 2015). Diseases and hunger 
ravage many of them on their journeys to new countries, especially if the host country has 
no friendly pro-refugee policies. 
2.10 Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter scrutinizes the various sources related to the research topic by 
placing them into context. In this chapter, a comparison between Western nations and the 
GCC regarding the nature and amount of aid to Syria was presented. The chapter implies 
that despite GCC members not being a part of the 1951 Convention, they are doing their 
part to mitigate the neighbouring Syrian crisis. The last sections of the chapter then 
concentrated on Qatar’s efforts and role in the mitigation of this crisis. The efforts in this 
case are both internal, in the form of accepting Syrian migrants who enter via visas, and 
external, in the form of aid contributions to organisations providing aid to those affected 
by the Syrian migrant crisis.   
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
In this chapter, the methodology that was used to complete the research objectives is 
described in detail. To do so, the research approach is first defined and the sources that 
were used to obtain data relevant to the research are also addressed. Since the research 
primarily involved the collection and analysis of qualitative data, various criteria that 
were applied are also described, including the sampling methods used, the sample sizes 
and the participants involved in the research. The methods used to collect relevant data 
for the study and the ethical considerations before carrying out the study are also 
addressed in separate sections.  
3.1. Research Approach and Data Sources 
The research methodology used to answer the research questions relies primarily 
upon a qualitative methods approach while also drawing upon a number of secondary 
sources. This entailed the collection, analysis and integration of qualitative research. In 
this case, the qualitative data included open-ended data gathered through interviews. Data 
analysis in this research methodology involves checklists to test hypotheses or respond to 
the research questions while using statistical analysis of the data collected via various 
instruments. Although each of these approaches is different, implementing this approach 
ensures that the research addresses the depth and breadth of the phenomenon, and enables 
the study to offset the inherent deficiencies of a single approach. Consequently, this 
approach was chosen in this case because of its ability to explain the findings. The study 
used interviews, secondary data and documentary analysis.  
  
   
33 
 
The primary aim of this study was to identify the efforts made by the State of 
Qatar to improve the situation of displaced Syrians within Qatar after the Syrian crisis. 
Additionally, a limited amount of quantitative data was gathered in the form of statistics 
about the number of Syrians living in Qatar and information about state aid provided to 
Syrian refugees. The qualitative part of the research aimed to explore the experiences of 
Syrian migrants who entered Qatar after the crisis.  
 The methods used in this research to collect primary data included home visits, 
interviews with 10 households (15-minute semi-structured individual interviews) and one 
interview with an expert, Mr. Adrdor from Qatar Charity. In addition, during the 
interviews with the Syrian migrants, I also tried to observe their living conditions. 
Interviews were conducted from March 2018 to May 2018.  
To establish the extent to which Qatar has contributed to the humanitarian efforts 
in Syria, the researcher combed through data available through the Financial Tracking 
Service. Additionally, the researcher carried out an online search to establish the number 
of Syrian immigrants hosted in Qatar. The researcher also conducted an interview with an 
expert working with a non-governmental organization (NGO), Qatar Charity, to examine 
ways in which Qatar-based NGOs help people fleeing from Syria as well as those 
displaced within the country.  
The primary data used for this research included interviews that were conducted 
with 10 Syrian forced migrants who entered Qatar after the crisis. Additional data from 
various humanitarian organizations such as the UNHCR was also incorporated to give 
insight and context.  
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The Qatari government has recorded the number of Syrians who entered Qatar 
after the crisis in 2011 and their visa status, but these figures were impossible to obtain, 
although this is essential information for this study. The records are confidential and after 
the long process of obtaining access to them, I had to sign a pledge not to share them or 
cite them in my study. However, the ministry of Statistics guided me to use publicly 
available published data, since these figures do not vary much from the accurate figures 
kept confidential by the government.  
The secondary data sources of for the study include public records that are freely 
accessible. Most of the data were sourced from the Human Rights Commission and the 
UNHCR’s website and database. In addition, a published interview with Mr. Khlid 
Alatyaa, the Minister of Defense in the State of Qatar, and other published articles and 
books were used as sources of information.  
 
3.2. Research Design  
3.2.1. Choice of Qualitative Method   
Research on Syrian migrants in Qatar was conducted by assessing the personal 
stories and experiences of individuals to gain an insight into their plight and the abuses 
they are being subjected as a result of being displaced. By using qualitative methods, the 
research aimed to understand the different perspectives of the facts and the implications 
outlined by the migrants. In this case, such an approach helped to ensure that factual first-
hand information from the subjects was obtained for deciphering and analyzing the 
situation of Syrian migrants who entered Qatar after the Syrian crisis. In particular, the 
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research involved conducting interviews with Syrian migrants who entered Qatar after 
the Syrian crisis in 2010, who were randomly selected via the snowball sampling 
technique. In this case, the selection of research respondents at random aimed to 
eliminate bias and to enhance the research outcomes. In this regard, the extensive insights 
into the situation of Syrian migrants in Qatar were facilitated through the interviews, 
which aimed at understanding the experiences of the migrants.  
In addition to the interviews, the prevailing situation faced by the Syrian migrants 
in Qatar will also be deduced by making a series of general observations. Through such 
efforts, it will be possible to identify suitable interventions that could be made by Qatar to 
improve the situation of Syrian immigrants, especially since the Syrian crisis. Contrary to 
the misleading information and propaganda that may be circulated by various media 
outlets, this approach will ensure that the real situation faced by the Syrian immigrants in 
Qatar can be determined, thus making it possible to judge whether substantial 
interventions have been initiated in Qatar. For instance, the situation can be evaluated 
through the assessment of previous projects and initiatives in Qatar, as well as the 
experiences faced by the Syrian migrants in Qatar. In this case, detailed stories of the 
experiences of different Syrian immigrants will help in establishing whether Qatar has 
been concerned about their plight and intervened appropriately through different 
humanitarian approaches. To achieve this, contact was made with 10 participants who 
were able to describe their journey and encounters while leaving Syria and arriving in 
Qatar.  
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This approach helped in getting first-hand information on any abuses or 
mistreatment that might have been perpetrated by the State of Qatar against the Syrian 
migrants. For this reason, each of the selected respondents for this study was accorded 
enough interview time to detail their experiences and encounters in Qatar. Specifically, 
the main emphasis was on key aspects such as possible harassment from various 
administrative entities in Qatar, and the perceptions and attitudes of the general public in 
Qatar. In order to avoid bias, these interviews were collected from Syrian migrants 
currently living in Qatar, an approach that further enhanced a relative comparison in 
terms of the general situation faced by such migrants. For this study, I felt it would be 
highly suitable to advertise the study and engage people who were ready to participate.  
3.2.2. Sampling Method  
In this research, I used the snowball sampling approach to select participants. The 
respondents were accessed via personal contact with friends and colleagues. The 
snowball sampling was applied within this society, where well-matched respondents were 
asked to propose other suitable respondents who could offer valid information for the 
study. The researcher identified one potential participant who helped to unearth others. 
Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling approach. Thus it has no probability 
involved. The researcher used personal judgment to select the initial participants.  
The criteria for respondents to qualify to be involved in this study (Table 1) included the 
following: they had to be aged over 18 years because of the sensitive features of the 
research, which could result in ethical problems arising from interviewing young 
individuals. No inclusion measures such as gender, orientation, profession or income 
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level were used, as they were deemed to be insignificant for assessing experiences and 
the process of acclimatization. 
 
 
Table 1: 
 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Inclusion criteria  Exclusion criteria  
Adults over 18 years  Minors below 18 years  
Syrian migrants in Qatar who left their 
home country because of the crisis  
Lived as migrants in other countries then 
entered Qatar 
Syrian migrants who have been living in 
Doha for 12 months or more   
Syrian migrants who have not yet spent 
complete 12 months in Qatar 
 
 
Four possible participants were excluded because they had lived as migrants in 
other countries, which is a different experience; migrants with less than 12 months in 
Qatar, because of the limited nature of their experience, were also excluded. 
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3.2.3. Sample Size  
Any appropriate persons who approached the researcher and met the research 
criteria were chosen on the basis of “first come first served” (Robinson, 2014). The 
researcher ensured that all participants were able to provide reliable information 
regarding the topic. If strong interest was shown by potential interviewees, they were 
contacted and emailed the ethical approval for the study given by Qatar University, 
attached to the interview questions. Afterward, they were given time to contact the 
researcher before I initiated contact with them in order to confirm their desire to 
participate in the study. 
Although it is debatable, there are no specific rules for determining the sample 
size in a qualitative study. Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano and Morales (2007) claimed 
that narrative studies need only a collection of tales from a small number of people. 
Larger samples are essential for studies that seek to determine broader patterns in the 
data. Thus for this study, the sample size was 10 participants. 
  
  
   
39 
 
3.2.4. Participants  
Ten participants (three males and seven females) were interviewed and took part 
in this research. Some initial demographic data of the respondents are represented in 
Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: 
 
Demographic Details of Interviewees 
No.  Participant’s 
Name* 
Gender Age  Year Entered 
Qatar  
Visa Type 
1 KA Male  55 2012 Working   
2 FR  Female 42 2012 Family visit  
3 OM Male 24 2014 Working 
4 OA Male 28 2012 Student 
5 AR Female 32 2015 Working  
6 UO Female 30 2012 Family visit 
7 SH Female 32 2017 Family visit 
8 AF Female 30 2014 Family visit 
9 AA Female 31 2015 Family visit 
10 MK Female  21 2014 Student  
* Names have been changed to protect privacy. 
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3.3. Data Collection  
3.3.1. Secondary Data: Quantitative 
The study aimed to discover how many Syrians live in Qatar and how many have entered 
the country since the Syrian crisis. To do this, I also accessed information from other 
websites to give more information on migration trends in Qatar and other Gulf States. 
One such website pointed to the increase (spike) in the overall populations of the Gulf 
states since 2011, which would suggest the entry of more migrants, mostly refugees 
("GLMM - Gulf Labour Markets and Migration", n.d.). Table 3 below shows a sample of 
this information.  
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Table 3. 
 
Estimates of Foreign Residents in Qatar by Country of Origin (Source:  
Country of Citizenship Estimates Date of Reference 
India 650,000 Dec 2016 
Nepal >350,000 Jan 2017 
Bangladesh 280,000 May 2016 
Philippines 260,000 Jan 2017 
Egypt 200,000 Feb 2015 
Sri Lanka 145,256 Dec 2016 
Pakistan 125,000 Oct 2016 
Syria 54,000 Nov 2015 
 
 
Table 3shows that among other nationalities of migrants, Syrians were the minority. 
However, it is evidence that Qatar never stopped receiving Syrians. 
3.3.2. Qualitative Data: Detailed Narratives and Interviews  
Information concerning the situation of Syrian migrants in Qatar was collected 
through detailed interviews and narratives of the experiences faced by the selected 
respondents. Considering the in-depth nature of the required research work, the process 
of collecting data from the respondents took place over a period of two weeks to ensure 
that all the relevant information was collected. In this case, all the necessary logistical 
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arrangements were made via emails and phone calls to ensure that all was in order for 
effective collection of the desired data and information.  
The scheduled interviews aimed at collecting information regarding the 
experience of Syrian migrants in Qatar as well as examples of how they have been 
permitted or denied their human rights by local officials in Qatar. In this case, the study 
aimed to collect responses from the selected respondents about a few sensitive topics that 
highlighted the abuses perpetrated against them during their stay. To allow time for such 
stories to emerge, the respondents were afforded enough time to detail their personal 
experiences in Qatar. Allocating enough time avoided situations where the respondents 
may have felt pressured into hurriedly giving the information needed for the research. 
This turned out to be the case, since all the relevant considerations were factored into the 
approach, which aimed to collect essential information and data regarding the 
experiences faced by Syrian migrants in Qatar. Similarly, this approach also aimed to 
capture the thoughts, feelings, remarks and emotions of the selected respondents 
regarding the whole issue of the circumstances and the experience of Syrian migrants in 
Qatar.  
3.3.3. Interview Questions  
The detailed narratives of the respondents facilitated comprehension of the 
situation faced by Syrian migrants in Qatar. Through the narratives obtained with the help 
of relevant leading interview questions, the respondents were able to describe their plight 
and the issues faced throughout their stay in Qatar as migrants. In particular, the leading 
interview questions aimed at highlighting the efforts that had been undertaken by the 
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State of Qatar to improve the situation of displaced Syrians following the conflict arising 
from the Syrian crisis. Such an approach aimed at elaborating the various aspects 
characterizing the situation of Syrian migrants in Qatar.  
The interviews took a semi-structured format guided by a list of questions to 
prompt the interviewees and obtain their status.  The full list of interview questions is 
presented in Appendix A.  In summary, the interview questions covered topics such as 
personal details (age, marital status, etc.), the journey taken from Syria to Qatar, visa 
status, current employment, experiences in Qatar and plans for the future. 
Some interviews were carried out in the homes of the Syrian migrants and some 
through phone calls at a time that suited the interviewees. The interviews were carried out 
in Arabic and took approximately 15 minutes.   
Different approaches were used to analyze the collected data and information 
from the respondents. The data analysis process involved the transcription of the recorded 
interview narratives and further analysis of the transcripts.  
3.3.4. Interview Transcription  
The study relied on the verbal narratives of the respondents regarding the situation 
and the experience of Syrian migrants in Qatar. These narratives were recorded verbatim 
from the respondents where permission was given to do so. Afterward, the recordings 
were transcribed according to the principles of narration and discourse analysis. This 
involved writing down all the narratives as spoken by respondents. Because the main 
focus of the study was to establish the current status and the outcomes faced by Syrian 
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migrants in Qatar, the content of the interview recordings was the main emphasis, as 
opposed to the manner in which the narratives were presented by different respondents.  
3.3.5. Analysis  
The primary aim of the study was to analyze the recorded stories. This was done 
by examining the interview transcripts to discover themes and elements that were 
common to the various narratives.  Some of the themes that arose from this examination 
included the route they came to Qatar, the reasons why they left Syria and the facilities 
they have (or need) as migrants who do not know if they will ever go back to Syria or 
whether they will remain migrants forever. The thematic analysis was designed to 
highlight answers to the significant questions the participants were asked and to give us a 
detailed picture of their lives.  The analysis further revealed themes related to the route 
traveled from Syria to Qatar, visas and residency status, and healthcare and education.  
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3.3.6 The Syrian School 
The Syrian school was a subject frequently discussed in the interviews, and this 
requires some background information. The Syrian school in Qatar, located in Duhail, is 
a community school that is the only school in Qatar that accepts and enrols Syrian 
students without residency permits. The school offers classes starting at primary level up 
to twelfth grade. Based on the interviews that were conducted, it became clear that the 
school’s numbers have been growing, with new pupils being admitted every year. 
Therefore, visiting the Syrian school was needed to have a closer look. On 17th October 
2018, I visited the Syrian Community School and met the administration officials, Mr. 
Mohammed and Mr. Akram, who talked about the establishment of the school and their 
answers provided an insight into the major issues the school might be facing. The Syrian 
school was established in 2013; the Syrian embassy requested to have a school, especially 
after the arrival of a huge number of Syrians without residency who entered the country 
using visitors’ visas. The suggestion from the Syrian embassy to establish a school in 
2011 was welcomed by the Emir of Qatar, Emir Tamim bin Hammad Al Thani. A 
committee was held with number of Syrians, and academics from Turkey and Egypt, and 
they started the preparations for creating an administration and teachers to start the Syrian 
school. Thus, the building was provided by the Ministry of Education and the staff 
salaries are covered by the Ministry as well. However, the school is still in need of more 
support. From my visit I observed that the building was very old and small compared 
with the public schools in the State of Qatar.  
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At the time of the interview, the school had 900 students, all of whom are Syrians 
without residency. Once a child receives his or her residency, he/she loses his/her right to 
his study in the school, and must leave room for those who do not have residency. They 
have rejected around 240 students because of not having enough space or teachers. They 
submitted a request to the Ministry of Education to have extra space, and this was 
approved with the condition of no budget being granted. They requested funds from both 
Qatar Charity and Raf, but because of the many bureaucratic steps involved, no action 
has been taken so far. Luckily, in this case, a Syrian man donated money and they have 
new nine classes ready. However, they are still waiting for the Ministry of Education to 
approve the hiring of teachers for the new classes and thus the current status of the new 
developments is still pending.  
3.4. Ethical Considerations   
3.4.1. Confidentiality  
The main focus of the study was to get to know the experiences of Syrian 
migrants in Qatar. For this reason, the anonymity of the respondents was respected by not 
revealing their identities to other parties. The majority of the participants were very 
fearful and were initially suspicious about the purpose of the research. I clarified that the 
data were collected for study purposes only as part of a M.A. degree and that the research 
had nothing to do with the government. Moreover, to protect the participants’ identities, 
their real names have not been used in the study as I have opted for the use of 
pseudonyms. In addition, for those who did not want to be recorded, notes were taken 
instead of recordings.  
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3.4.2. Informed Consent  
Throughout the entire process of collecting information from respondents, proper 
communication regarding the intentions of the study was ensured. All of the selected 
respondents gave consent for the personal accounts of their experiences in Qatar to be 
used in the study, thus upholding the ethical principle of informed consent.  
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlines what methods were used in the collection and analysis of data, so as 
to fulfil the research objectives. It begins by portraying the research approach, which is 
dependent on qualitative methods; the methods used in the research involve reference to 
data sources and conducting interviews rather than surveys. However, secondary 
quantitative methods were also used in the analysis of the collected data and essentially 
encompass tables and statistical inferences. The chapter then concludes by noting the 
ethical considerations that were put in place, since the research includes the involvement 
of human participants.  
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Chapter 4: Data Collection and Analysis 
This chapter explains the various methods that were used to collect useful data. The data 
collected was predominantly of a qualitative nature and also involved published data 
from previous authors, as well as current projections and statistics from relevant expert 
bodies. To conclude up the chapter, data related to Qatar’s regional position in terms of 
its involvement with refugees were also collected.  
4.1. Secondary Data: Quantitative 
4.1.1. Published Data   
To find out the current number of Syrian immigrants in Qatar, the researcher 
communicated with the Ministry of Statistics and Planning, which is linked to the 
Ministry of Immigration. The researcher found old data on the official website of the 
Ministry of Statistics and Planning dating back to the time before the Syrian conflict 
broke out. The data were published in 2007. Other figures on the number of Syrians in 
Qatar were published in 2015 by Priya Dsouza, who studied the trends in Qatar’s 
expatriate populations. The figures she published in her report showed a great increase in 
the number of Syrians in Qatar, including those who entered Qatar after the Syrian crisis 
and, in some cases, those who have been born since that time to migrant families living in 
Qatar. According to these data, there were about 54,000 Syrians in Qatar as of 2015, 
representing 2.2% of the immigrant population in the country. This is illustrated in Figure 
9 below. The researcher also went through the worlddata.info database, where it was 
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established that in 2016, 21 Syrians made asylum applications in Qatar. Out of these, 18 
were accepted (Worlddata, 2018).  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Proportion of the Syrian population in Qatar in 2015. 
 
 
Since 2013, Qatar has been sending humanitarian aid to Syria. In 2013, the 
Government of Qatar gave Syrian people affected by the conflict a total of $100 million 
in aid (Reuters Staff, 2013). By September 2017, the total amount of money that Qatar 
had given in support of human rights in Syria was $1.6 billion, as reported by the 
Government Communication Office (Bukhari, 2017). This shows a significant rise in the 
aid given to the Syrian people over a short period of time, as illustrated in Figure 10 
below. Qatar-based charity organizations have also made significant aid contributions, 
totaling $452.6 million (Bukhari, 2017). The organizations include Qatar Red Crescent, 
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Qatar Charity, Afif Charity and Eid Charity. Qatar has also initiated a number of projects 
in Syria, including the Education Above All initiative, which has been able to provide 
education to about 985,000 Syrian children at a cost of $62 million starting in 2012. 
Another initiative called the Qatar Upholding Education for Syrians Trust was launched 
in 2016 at a cost of $150 million to support the education of about 400,000 Syrian 
children living in refugee camps (Bukhari, 2017) and this is still ongoing.   
 
 
 
Figure 11: Qatari aid to Syrian refugees in 2013 and 2017. 
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4.1.2. Data from the Financial Tracking Service  
Although there are countries ahead of Qatar in terms of aid provided to the Syrian 
people, Qatar has also been playing its part in terms of humanitarian aid, starting in 2013 
when the government first sent financial aid to the Syrian people. Table 4 shows the 
amounts Qatar has contributed, starting in 2013 (Qcharity.org, n.d.). The decrease in the 
amount of financial aid may be attributed to political reasons and the shift in Qatar’s 
priorities to concentrating on providing aid to rebels fighting against the incumbent 
Syrian regime. This decrease may also be as a result of more countries joining the effort 
to provide humanitarian aid to the Syrian population and may be a reflection of the lower 
gas and oil prices in 2016 and therefore lower overall income within the State of Qatar.  
 
 
Table 4. 
 
Qatari Financial Aid to Syria from 2013 to 2018 (Source: Qatar Charity 
Organization) 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Amount $108.7 m $153.7m $105.3 m $44.1m $68.1m $41.7 m 
 
 
Despite the fact that Western nations have been keen on the provision of aid to 
Syrian refugees, members of the GCC have also shown their support to refugees through 
the aid they dispense. Figure 11 below, for instance, shows various countries’ 
contributions to the crisis in terms of accepting Syrian refugees into their borders. In spite 
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of these figures however, no consistent pattern can be seen, with the contributions 
fluctuating from one year to another. The data from the Financial Tracking Service do not 
indicate how much of Qatar’s aid contribution went to Syria; hence the difficulty in 
establishing the exact extent to which Qatar has contributed to relief efforts in Syria 
based on the figures from the Financial Tracking Service. However, the efforts of some 
members of the GCC, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are well documented, as shown 
in Figure 11 below.  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Countries at the forefront of humanitarian aid to Syria (Source: oxfam.org 
[accessed 4 February 2019]). 
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4.1.3. International Developments at Qatar Charity  
The researcher had the chance to meet Mr. Mohammed Adrdor, an expert in 
humanitarian aid at Qatar Charity.  During the meeting, Mr. Adrdor was very welcoming 
and helpful; he shared some data that included the financial aid that Qatar Charity sent to 
the Syrians in the refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey in 2017. He explained 
the role and partners of Qatar Charity. He also shared raw unpublished data in the form of 
Excel spreadsheets on the external financial support provided by Qatar Charity since the 
Syrian crisis began in 2011, implemented in collaboration with Qatar Charity’s partners. 
These partners include United Nations agencies and NGOs supporting and relieving the 
neediest people in Syria.  Aid is classified into five sectors, namely (1) food, (2) shelter 
and non-food items, (3) education, (4) health and (5) economic recovery and 
infrastructure. According to the spreadsheet data shared by Mr. Adrdor, the total amount 
of money that Qatar Charity had sent to Syria as aid in 2017 was $73.17 million. Out of 
this, $12.49 million went to education, and $20.82 million went to emergency shelter and 
non-food items. Health took $8.27 million; $3.13 million went to water, sanitation and 
hygiene; and $20.02 million was spent on food security. Mr. Adrdor further revealed that, 
compared with other years, the relief interventions by Qatar Charity in Syria were 
significantly higher, the main cause being an increase in the number of Syrians in need of 
help.  
According to the Financial Tracking Services, the official figure for relief 
provided is approximately US$4,352,437 (Fts.unocha.org, n.d.). This figure is in contrast 
to what Mr. Adrdor stated signifying that either not all donations were reflected by the 
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Financial Tracking Services or that the figures he portrayed were somewhat inflated. 
Nevertheless, both of these figures point to increased commitment on Qatar’s part toward 
humanitarian assistance in Syria.  
4.1.4. Qatar’s Regional Position in Terms of Aid Contribution to Syria  
From the available statistics, it is quite clear that Qatar has made a significant 
contribution to the relief effort in Syria. Reports indicate that Qatar is among the top five 
countries in the Middle Eastern region in terms of humanitarian aid contributions to 
Syria. Non-governmental organizations that are based in Qatar have consistently given 
aid to the people of Syria since 2011, with Qatar Charity being consistently ranked 
among the world’s top NGO contributors to the relief efforts in Syria (Financial Tracking 
Service, 2018). Qatar’s position as a significant aid contributor to Syria is further 
enhanced by the data provided by Qatar Charity, which shows that not only is aid to Syria 
being provided through government channels, but also by ordinary people throughout the 
world (Qcharity.org, n.d.).  
Indirectly, Qatar has also shown its intentions of being a regional leader in terms 
of aid and donations by the level of commitment it portrays toward international 
humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations High Commission of Refugees 
(UNHCR). Figures released by the UNHCR showed that donations made by Qatar 
increased from US$26,804,578 in 2017 to US$50,819,476 (from both the government 
and private organizations) in 2018 (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 
2018). Notably, out of this figure, private organizations from Qatar contributed a 
significantly large amount at US$42,232,172, as compared with the State of Qatar at 
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US$8,587,304 (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2018). The contribution 
by private organizations from Qatar alone is ahead of most other countries in the region, 
with only Saudi Arabia beating this figure narrowly at US$47,813,994 (United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, 2018). Although this is not a direct manifestation of 
Qatar’s aid to Syria, it shows the nation’s commitment to humanitarian aid and donations, 
some of which is eventually channeled to Syria.  
4.2 Chapter Summary 
In a nutshell, the data collected showed a general increment in the aid that has been given 
to those affected by the Syrian crisis by the State of Qatar. The quantitative data collected 
from published data for instance, showed that by 2015, the State of Qatar had taken in 
54,000 Syrian migrants, almost making up 2.2% of the overall population, and this 
number is expected to continue rising.  However, this number does not reflect the 
accurate number of the forced Syrian migrants who received their visas after the Syrian 
Crisis. The collected data also shows that the aid provided to the Syrian Crisis by Qatar 
did not only entail the resettlement of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar but also came in 
the form of aid given to humanitarian causes both by governmental organizations and 
NGOs.   
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Chapter 5: Findings from the Interviews 
The interviews revealed further details in addition to the statistical data on the 
number of Syrian forced migrants living in Qatar and the amount contributed by 
organizations and the Government of Qatar toward initiatives set up to help displaced 
Syrians. Thematic analysis of the interview transcripts and the notes where permission 
was not given to record the interviews, revealed a number of common threads in the 
narratives and provided a more detailed picture of the lives of displaced Syrians living in 
Qatar. The interview data were supplemented with observations of the Syrians’ living 
conditions during the interviews. 
5.1. The Syrian Community in Qatar 
The interviews suggested that there is no specific “Syrian community” in Qatar. 
Only 3 out of the 10 interviewees lived in the same area. When asked about any 
gatherings or meetings they have with other Syrians, the interviewees tended to reply that 
they live apart and do not really share any cultural occasions with other Syrians in Qatar. 
In addition, although their housing is shared, mostly with other families (Algerian, 
Egyptian, and other nationalities), it was noticed that no Syrian families shared the same 
housing.  
In addition, the experiences shared by the interviewees suggested that the Syrians 
do not receive any special treatment form the Qatari government, either positive or 
negative.   
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5.2. Route from Syria to Qatar 
Each participant had a different story and different experience to tell, yet they 
almost all shared the same route that they took on their journey to Qatar. The answers to 
the first three interview questions showed that 7 out of the 10 participants followed the 
same route: they first entered Lebanon because of the shared land border with Syria, then 
traveled by air to Qatar. In the case of the two other interviewees, one had to go to 
Turkey first, then Qatar; the other went to Egypt first, then Qatar. 
One participant and her family came from Damascus; the other nine participants 
were from two cities, which are known to be Sunni-majority cities (Aleppo and Homs), 
with six interviewees from Aleppo and three from Homs. All the participants from 
Aleppo had lost their houses and their jobs, and had moved to the countryside. These 
participants had applied for jobs in Qatar to get visas and leave in search of better 
working and conditions than what they had in their homeland. 
5.3. Current Residency Status and Employment 
Eight out of 10 participants had Qatari residency permits. The remaining two still 
had not obtained Qatari residency, mostly because of having a low income and not 
meeting residency requirements. However, since they had visiting visas, they were still in 
the country as of the time of the interview. The Syrians without residency will have to 
renew their visiting visas every 6 months at a cost of 250 QR per person. However, 
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according to the State of Qatar’s immigration laws, they do not have to leave the country 
to do so, as the process is entirely facilitated by the Ministry of the Interior.  
The Syrian forced migrants in Qatar tended to have different experiences that 
were largely associated with their residency status. The interview responses suggested 
that Syrians with official residency in Qatar have had, overall, positive experiences. The 
participant KA (55-year-old male) said, “I managed to work as an engineer in a big 
company in Qatar within 2 months since I came here in 2012; the payment is truly good 
which allowed me to bring my family to join me here. Me and my family love living in 
Qatar and see it as a second home.” The interview participants who had residency permits 
did not seem to have been subjected to any abuse and mistreatment perpetrated by 
various governmental departments. For instance, their rights as official residents mean 
that they have the freedom to marry and intermingle with the rest of the people in Qatar. 
Syrians with residency are also able to secure the professional jobs available to other 
multinational and foreign workers. This implies that they were not likely to be affected 
by the poor working conditions that characterize the informal employment sectors, such 
as laborers, small private companies and street food vendors. For instance, according to 
an expose by The Guardian, most workers who lack residence permits and work visas in 
Qatar are subjected to inhumane working conditions such as low wages and deprivation 
of their passports and lack the freedom to switch jobs (Falconer, 2014). The workers most 
affected were from Philippines, Libya and, unsurprisingly, Syria.  For these reasons, the 
Syrian forced migrants with residency in Qatar tended to describe their experiences as 
pleasant.  
  
   
59 
 
 On the other hand, the Syrian forced migrants in Qatar who were still on visitor 
visas tended to share narratives describing unpleasant experiences.  This is because they 
were mainly employed in the country’s informal working sector, with the majority 
working at construction sites and on other government projects such as schools and 
World Cup venues (Connor, 2016). However, unlike their counterparts who have Qatari 
residency permits, Syrians on visitor visas described how they have constantly been 
subjected to poor working conditions. UO (32-year-old female) said: “Although I have a 
degree I cannot be hired without a residency; moreover, my husband works as a part-
timer unofficially with a minimum salary that provides us with the essentials.” According 
to the interviewees’ narratives, those on visitor visas often face problems such as 
deteriorating health because of their constant exposure to poor work environments. In 
addition to this, they have also been subjected to harassment and discrimination in the 
form of underpayment for their services. This latter aspect has trapped these displaced 
Syrians in poverty.  
5.4. Healthcare  
All the eight interviewees who had Qatari residency enjoyed free healthcare, with 
one interviewee describing the Qatari healthcare system as “one of the best” and, overall, 
the Syrian migrants with residency indicated that they are satisfied with the healthcare 
provided by the Qatari Government.  However, the Syrian forced migrants in Qatar on 
visitor visas have been subjected to higher healthcare costs. They have to pay 100% of 
their healthcare costs, which is exacerbated by how they are prone to ailments caused by 
or aggravated by working in dangerous or substandard working environments. It is 
  
   
60 
 
completely different for the other individuals with residency and/or a higher income, 
whose healthcare costs are usually subsidized and catered for though medical and health 
coverage. This is a reflection of the detrimental lifestyle that characterizes the 
experiences of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar on visit visas. However, in the case of an 
emergency the Qatari government provides all those who live in their lands with fast and 
good healthcare. Mrs. Asma, who is still without a residency permit, said, “My husband 
and I were walking on the seashore, when my husband suddenly fainted, so I called 999 
and they sent an ambulance in less than 10 minutes and they took a good care of him until 
he was fine. They even offered to take him to the hospital or drive us home”.  
5.5. Education 
The Syrian forced migrants in Qatar have also found it difficult to access 
education. Even the interviewees with Qatari residency explained that they found the 
school fees and the lack of public universities to be a challenge for them. The 
interviewees who did not yet have residency are not allowed to enroll their children in 
any schools, either public or private, until they become permanent residents in Qatar. 
Only the Syrian Community School accepts the children of Syrians without residency for 
enrolment. However, this school is crowded and has no more room for all of the Syrian 
children, and no support from the Ministry of Education or the Charity Organizations has 
been provided to increase the number of classes (see Section 3.3.6). This is important, 
since this school is the only hope for those who do not have residency yet. To quote Mrs. 
Farida, “When we first arrived to Qatar, it was 2012. The Syrian school was not 
established yet and I had a 15-year-old son, who no other schools in Qatar accepted him 
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without residency. Thank God that we obtained the residency within 8 months.” Another 
side of the story from after the establishment of the Syrian Community School was 
provided by Mrs. Samah said, “My daughter is 7 years old and she wasn’t accepted in the 
Syrian Community School, where her two brothers go every day, due to huge capacity.” 
It is as a result of this difficulty in accessing education, especially higher 
education, that many Syrian migrants and their families have not been able to acquire the 
qualifications needed for them to find jobs in the formal employment sector, where 
working conditions and pay are better. This phenomenon has been made even more 
difficult for those on visit visas because of overcrowding in the only existing learning 
facility for Syrian migrants. The Syrian school is now unable to enroll more migrant 
children because of the high number of students and the delay in approvals to hire more 
teachers from the Ministry of Education. 
5.6. The Experiences of Three Syrian Women Living in Qatar 
5.6.1. UmOmran  
UmOmran is a housewife with three children, all of whom were born in Qatar (in 
2011, 2014 and 2017).  She entered Qatar on a visitor visa and her husband works in a 
small private company. She has been in the process of applying for residency since 2011 
and she still does not have it. When I asked her how living without a residency permit 
impacted her life in Qatar, she described her life as follows: 
I am partly living. My kids can’t join any schools in Qatar; the only school 
that accepts Syrians with no residency is the Syrian School and that school 
has no more space to contain students.   
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She mentioned that they are paying for 100% of their medical care and that during her 
pregnancies as well as the birth of all three of her children, she had to pay around 5000 
QR each time. 
5.6.2. Sahmah  
Samah is a 34-year-old Syrian woman who is married and has four children.  She has 
been married for 13 years. Her husband entered Qatar in 2011, and she and her children 
spent 2 years in Syria waiting for the chance to join him. He works for a private company 
and does not have a stable income, which makes it hard to get a visa for his family. Two 
of her children study at the Syrian school, but her daughter was not accepted into the 
school because of the limited space for enrolment.  Education is not provided to them and 
it is hard to find schools for their children.  They pay 100% of their healthcare costs. On 
top of all this, she cannot find employment without first obtaining a residency permit. 
The family lives in Musaimer in two bedrooms that are part of a house that was divided 
among three families. Their living space is kept clean and tidy, but looks cramped for a 
family of six.  
5.6.3. Asma  
Asma is a Syrian from Hama who worked there as a teacher for 5 years. After the war 
started, her situation became very bad. Her home had no electricity and after the city 
came under military control, she was displaced to the countryside. In the countryside, 
they got by on using batteries to provide light and other amenities, and the water supply 
was scarce. In her experience as a teacher, the educational system was unstable and the 
schools would stop for up to 2 weeks at a time.  In 2015, she became engaged to a Syrian 
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who had a job opportunity in Qatar and who managed to bring her to the country on a 
visitor visa. They got married and she obtained her residency in 7 months.  
5.6.4 What the Experiences Mean 
Based on the experiences of the three Syrian families outlined above, it is evident that the 
situation of most Syrian forced migrants in Qatar is not necessarily as ideal as would 
appear to be the case. Out of the three women involved in the study, two of them and 
their family members had received residence permits by the time of the interview. 
Another fact that became clear from the interviews is that the plight and quality of life of 
Syrian forced migrants in Qatar is significantly dependent on their immigration status. 
For example, all the three women interviewed tended to attribute their hardships to the 
lack of residence permits, which would essentially enable them to access the same 
services as those who have residency.  
5.7 Chapter Summary 
In a nutshell, this chapter discusses the findings from the data collected in the interviews. 
Based on the collected data, this chapter portrays a picture of Syrian forced migrants, 
each with a different story from the next. The first section, for instance, notes that there is 
no specific Syrian community in Qatar. The chapter also points out that despite the 
majority of Syrian residents possessing residence permits, those who do not possess such 
permits live a drastically different life with minimal benefits. In the last sections of the 
chapter, three women paint a grim picture of life for Syrian forced migrants without 
residency permits in Qatar.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1. Summary 
 This study started with a hypothesis assuming that regardless of not being a 
signatory member of the 1951 Convention on refugees, the State of Qatar continues to 
enhance the experiences of both Syrian forced migrants inside Qatar and Syrian refugees 
in the region through a diversity of humanitarian aid tools and initiatives. 
Throughout the study, two variables were used to measure the accuracy of the 
hypothesis or to prove it wrong.  Thus the main question of this research paper is “What 
efforts have been made by the State of Qatar to improve the situation of displaced Syrians 
since the crisis?”  After asking the question, the two variables were used to answer the 
following sub-objectives that were extracted from the main research question:  
1- Evaluating efforts that have been made by the Qatari Government to assist Syrian 
refugees that are displaced elsewhere by tracking the Qatari Government’s 
funding of humanitarian aid.  
2- Evaluating Qatari efforts to address issues regarding Syrian forced migrants inside 
Qatar by studying migrants’ experiences.  
3- Evaluating the experiences of Syrian migrants in relation to the Qatari 
Government. The data were collected through a qualitative research method 
including the analysis of interviews and secondary source data available through 
resources published online. The outputs of the collected data were analyzed to 
answer the research question.  
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 The main finding of this study is that Qatar does welcome Syrians with visas, 
considering them as migrants. The Syrian forced migrants who entered Qatar after 2011 
can be classified into two categories. The first category was Syrians with residency 
permits and the second group was those who still live in Qatar on visitor visas. Therefore, 
the experience of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar is determined by their visa status. In 
particular, migrants having residency in Qatar were not subjected to bad experiences in 
the country. However, migrants on visitor visas in Qatar were subjected to negative 
experiences such as poor working conditions, and restricted access to healthcare and 
education.  Furthermore, the study established that the State of Qatar has made very little 
real effort to improve the situation of forced displaced Syrian migrants within Qatar after 
the Syrian crisis. These assertions are supported by information provided by humanitarian 
organizations such as Amnesty International, who have confirmed that there has been 
little progress made by Qatar in terms of improving Syrian migrant workers’ rights. This 
is because many migrant workers have been limited to working in the country’s informal 
employment sector, whereby they work in construction sites characterized by poor 
working conditions. Furthermore, this indicates that future research should focus on the 
different approaches that could be undertaken by humanitarian organizations such as 
Amnesty International to compel Qatar to improve the rights of migrant workers. For a 
more in-depth future study, it would be interesting to ascertain the number of Syrians 
located in Qatar on visitor or temporary visas. Although the data concerning domestic 
numbers of Syrian migrants are considered confidential now, maybe in future, this will 
not be the case. In addition, such data are important for researchers to suggest solutions 
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for displaced persons, since it can give evidence of accurate numbers of migrants in Qatar 
and how the government is going to deal with them in future. This is especially true, 
since it is not reasonable to leave their statues pending waiting for them to go back to 
Syria, which might take decades or even never happen at all.  
 In response to the hypothesis statement therefore, Qatar has not succeeded in 
facilitating residency and applying social protection measures for displaced Syrians in the 
past 8 years within its borders. Although this might not be its own doing directly, factors 
such as being a non-signatory of the 1951 Convention play a major role in hindering 
Qatar’s efforts. This is portrayed in the discrepancy between the aid Qatar donates to the 
international community and that which it commits to Syria and its population directly. 
On the other hand, although Qatar has largely failed at the rehabilitation of refugees 
within its borders, it has largely been successful in its efforts to ensure the facilitation and 
social protection of Syrian refugees outside its borders. In addition, there is transparency 
in the numbers when it comes to figures outside Qatar, such as Qatari contributions in the 
form of financial aid. Qatar should be proud of this contribution; however, when it comes 
to domestic figures, like the number of Syrians who entered Qatar after the Syrian Crisis 
in 2011, and financial help including health care and education, this information is not 
published.  
 However, the only published figure of the number of Syrians was announced only 
once in an interview, which is not a very reliable source of data and, in fact, does not 
reflect an accurate number, since it matches the number of all the Syrians in Qatar even 
before the Crisis in 2011. However, the Emir of Qatar recently has announced in 
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September 2018 that Asylum Seekers’ Law Number 11 will be implemented, which is a 
promising step that might lead to accepting refugees as a legal category in future. In 
addition, the nature of the Qatari regime might have contributed towards not being very 
welcoming to a politically active group of migrants who might bring instability to the 
country, these Syrians are considered to be rebels. It is also common among Muslim 
societies, such as Qatari society, to establish jihadi groups if the elements of jihad 
applies, which, in the Syrians’ case, does apply.  
6.2. Limitations of Research 
Throughout the research, I was unable to use official data from the different 
government ministries. This is because these data were kept confidential by the separate 
ministries, and I was not able to interview Qatari policymakers during the time of writing 
the thesis. Similarly, I did not manage to obtain precise published data concerning Qatar 
or the GCC with respect to the issue of Syrian migrants. In addition to this, the sample 
size was small and many Syrians were afraid of participating in the interviews, thus 
forcing me to write notes instead of recording interviews. This concern also limited the 
ways in which I was able to reproduce exact quotes from interviews.  
6.3. Implications for Policymakers 
On the basis of the study findings, policymakers are recommended to look for 
appropriate alternatives to improve the lives of forced Syrian migrants in Qatar. Along 
with that, the government might reconsider signing the 1951 Refugee Convention; since 
it is never too late to take such a huge step, especially with the State of Qatar’s potential 
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to be one of the richest developed countries in the Middle East. In addition, policymakers 
could explore ways of providing better access to education and healthcare for the forced 
Syrian migrants in Qatar, given that majority of public schools are crowded and do not 
have enough resources to accommodate the increasing number of Syrian migrants living 
in Qatar. One way to do this would be to mobilize more resources in terms of human 
resources as well as monetary aid to the cause of settling forced Syrian migrants in Qatar.  
Policymakers should also step up aid efforts in mitigating the Syrian refugee crisis 
outside Qatar’s borders. There are a number of ways to do this directly as follows:  
I. Increase in financial aid to the UNHCR’s docket in charge of Syria. 
II. Better cooperation with the international organizations regarding the provision of 
logistical support, including non-monetary items such as food. 
III. Coming up with new measures that will essentially promote the admission, 
settlement and rehabilitation of Syrian refugees within the State of Qatar.  
IV. Suggesting and insisting that the State of Qatar starts the process of becoming a 
signatory member of both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 
This will go a long way in ensuring that Qatar plays an active and visible role in 
the facilitation of refugees within the region, including those from Syria.  
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
I am Asma Almarri, a Master Students in the Gulf Studies Program, Qatar 
University. These interview questions are aimed at providing first-hand information 
about the experiences of Syrian forced migrants in Qatar. The information gathered from 
the interviews will be used in filling research gaps for the purposes of an MA research 
study entitled “The Efforts Made by the State of Qatar to improve the Situation of 
Displaced Syrians after the Syrian Crisis: A Case Study of the Experience of Syrian 
Migrants in Qatar”.   
The interviews will be conducted randomly using a snowball sample of around 
10–15 Syrians who have been living in Qatar since the Arab Spring. 
The following interview questions will be asked: 
 Tell me a little about yourself: Your name, age, marital status and what part of Syria 
you come from. 
 Can you tell me about your experiences in Syria before you came to Qatar? 
 Tell me a little about your journey from Syria to Qatar and how you got your visa. 
How did you come to know about Qatar before you came here and how did you get 
here? 
 Where in Qatar do you live and what has your experience been like living here? 
 What do you do for a living where you stay? 
 Did you come alone or were there other Syrians you came with? Where do they live 
and what do most of them do for a living?  
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 Tell me about your plans for the future. Do you plan to stay in Qatar or do you hope 
to return to Syria one day? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
